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LIABILITY FOR STUDENT-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX IN LIGHT OF DAVIS V. 
MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Student-to-student sexual harassment is not new to our 
public school system. It is a growing concern and has attracted 
attention from legal commentators as well as the national me-
dia.1 Although peer harassment in public schools is not a recent 
phenomenon, cases addressing the issue have only recently ap-
peared. Three circuits in particular have dealt with these cases: 
the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh. Although the Tenth and the 
Fifth Circuits have not held educational institutions liable for 
peer sexual harassment,2 the Eleventh Circuit has struggled 
with the question. 3 
Sexual harassment has been defined as "verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an 
employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits, provides 
different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or 
treatment protected under Title IX."4 Educational sexual harass-
ment, on the other hand, has been defined by the National Advi-
sory Council on Women's Educational Programs to mean "the 
use of authority to emphasize the sexuality or sexual identity of 
the student in a manner which prevents or impairs the student's 
1. See, e.g., NAN STEIN ET AL., SECRETS IN PUBLIC: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR 
SCHOOLS 2 (1993)(cosponsored by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and 
Wellesley College for Research on Women); Karen M. Davis, Reading, Writing, and 
Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer 
Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123 (1994); Edward S. Cheng, Boys Being Boys and Girls Being 
Girls-Student-To-Student Sexual Harassment From the Courtroom to the Classroom, 
7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 263 (1997); Phil Donahue: Six-Year-Olds Sexually Harassing 
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 5, 1994) (transcript No. 3897). 
2. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Rowinsky v. Bryan 
Independent Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996). 
3. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996) rev'd 
en bane, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), partial cert., 67 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Sept. 29, 
1998) (No. 97-843). 
4. 29 C.F.R. § 106.2 (1995). 
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full enjoyment of education[al] benefits, climate, or opportuni-
ties."5 
Until the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Franklin u. 
Gwinnet County Public School, 6 the only remedy available 
against an educational establishment for a sex discrimination 
claim under Title IX was the denial of federal funding to the 
institution.7 Because of this limitation, most suits brought be-
fore Franklin under Title IX were by women seeking equality in 
athletic and vocational programs.8 In Franklin, the Court held 
educational institutions liable to students for monetary damages 
under Title IX for intentional teacher-to-student sexual harass-
ment. This decision, while providing a remedy for teacher-to-
student sexual harassment, did not directly address the issue of 
student-to-student sexual harassment. 
Claims of hostile learning environments caused by peer sex-
ual harassment are beginning to multiply, but the courts have 
not yet fully addressed student-to-student sexual harassment. 
In response, some states have passed laws requiring schools to 
distribute anti-sexual-harassment policies to students.9 Unless 
the Supreme Court reverses the Eleventh Circuit, however, the 
Title IX road to holding educational institutions liable for peer 
sexual harassment seems to be closed. 10 All the cases which 
have reached the courts of appeal arguing institutional liability 
for peer sexual harassment have held that Title IX does not 
provide a basis for this type of suit. 11 
5. Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution 
to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 707 (1995) (citing 
Massachusetts Bd. of Educ., WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
MAsSACHUSE'ITS SCHOOLS 9 (1986) (curriculum and guide for school personnel, quoting 
the Advisory Council on Women's Educational Program's definition of sexual 
harassment in education)). 
6. 503 u.s. 60 (1992). 
7. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681-1688 (1980). 
8. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Yellow Springs 
Exempted Village Sch. Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 
1981); O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981); Bednar v. Nebraska Sch. 
Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1976); Canterino v. Barber, 564 F. Supp. 711 
(W.D. Ky. 1983). 
9. See Cal. Educ. Code § 212.6 (West 1994); Minn. Stat. § 127.46 (1994). 
10. See supra note 3. 
11. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5'h Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 165 (1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lO'h Cir. 1996); 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (ll'h Cir. 1997). 
137] STUDENT-TO-STUDENT HARASSMENT 139 
This article will analyze the various federal decisions culmi-
nating in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education and will 
then discuss why these courts are correct in finding that schools 
are not liable for student-to-student sexual harassment. Part II 
outlines the statutes that are relevant to this type of liability: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/2 Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972,13 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.14 Part III shows the evolution of sexual harassment in 
the field of education. Part IV then discusses the line of cases 
that has led to the Eleventh Circuit's most recent decision in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education15 and similar hold-
ings such as Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District. 16 
Part V argues that Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 
and similar cases have reached the right result under Title IX as 
it presently stands then offers some other alternatives to hold-
ing educational institutions liable for student-to-student sexual 
harassment. 
II. RELEVANT STATUTES 
A. TITLEVI 
Title VI was enacted by Congress "to make sure that funds of 
the United States are not used to support racial discrimina-
tion."17 Congress enacted Title VI under the Spending Clause of 
the Constitution/8 which does not allow direct regulation of the 
program.19 Rather, the remedy for a violation under the statute 
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000n (1988). Title VI reads in relevant part: "No person 
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1994). 
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Title IX provides in relevant part: "No person in 
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). A 
"program or activity" includes "all of the operations of . . . a local educational 
agency ... or other school system." 20 U.S.C. § 1687. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988). 
15. 120 F.3d 1390 (ll'h Cir. 1997). 
16. 80 F.3d 1006 (5'" Cir. 1996). 
17. 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964)(statement of Sen. Pastore). 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
19. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1970). 
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is withholding federal funding. 20 In Title IX, which was pat-
terned after Title VI, Congress replaced the words "race, color, 
or national origin" with "sex" to give sexual discrimination the 
same protection.21 
B. TITLEVII 
Sexual harassment was first addressed by laws seeking to 
eliminate the problem in the work place. In this context, there 
are two categories of harassment: quid pro quo and hostile envi-
ronment harassment.22 Quid pro quo harassment is an offer of a 
job-related benefit such as a raise or promotion in exchange for 
sexual favors. 23 As may be inferred from the context of this type 
ofharassment, an uneven power relationship exists between the 
person harassing and the person being harassed. This type of 
harassment corresponds directly with teacher-to-student harass-
ment, and the Supreme Court in Franklin has ruled that educa-
tional institutions are liable in monetary damages for quid pro 
quo of sexual harassment. 24 
The Supreme Court has also recognized hostile environment 
harassment. 25 Hostile environment harassment is concerned 
with an abusive atmosphere, most often created by employees 
with similar standing in the workplace. The Supreme Court, as 
of the 1998-1999 term, still had declined to decide whether Title 
IX provided a remedy for student-to-student harassment.26 For 
now, the question of hostile environment harassment remains 
unsettled. 
C. TITLE IX 
Like Title VI, Title IX was passed under the Spending 
Clause ofthe Constitution.27 The purpose of Title IX was to pre-
vent sexual discrimination in federally funded programs by 
20. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
23. See id. at 65-66. 
24. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
25. See id. at 73. The Court reasoned that several circuits' decisions and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines supported the conclusion that 
Title VII coverage was not limited to just the economic aspects of employment. 
26. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Ind. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5'h Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 S.Ct. 165 (1996); supra note 3. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
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withholding federal funding28-an idea lifted from Title VJ.29 
Title IX was intended to close a loophole in federal legislation 
that allowed educational institutions (mainly colleges and uni-
versities) to discriminate against female students and faculty. 30 
The Eleventh Circuit panel that reheard Davis, en bane, looked 
to a Title VII case, Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 31 to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title IX. 
The panel determined that a plaintiff must show the following: 
( 1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was 
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harass-
ment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her 
education and create an abusive educational environment; and 
(5) that some basis for institutional liability has been estab-
lished.32 
These requirements are borrowed to a large degree from Title 
VII principles. 33 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,34 one of the Supreme 
Court's first evaluations of sexual harassment under Title IX, 
the Court implied a private right of action for sexual harass-
ment claims. The Court in Cannon noted that denying financial 
support to institutions that discriminate, although a severe 
remedy, did not go far enough to protect the individual. In order 
to accomplish Title IX's objectives, the Court borrowed case law 
from Title VI. 35 
28. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
29. 117 CONG. REC. 39, 252 (1971) (statement by Sen. Bayh, sponsor of the billl 
("This is identical language, specifically taken from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act."). 
30. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193. Senator Bayh commented that this legislation 
"closes loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs." 118 
CONG. REC. 5803 (1972). 
31. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
32. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194. 
33. !d. at 1190. 
34. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
35. See id. at 717. 
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A. QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
In Alexander v. Yale University, 36 the Federal District Court 
of Conneticut was the first federal court to recognize a sexual 
harassment claim under Title IX.37 But this court only recog-
nized a certain kind of sexual harassment claim: quid pro quo. 
In Alexander, former students sought an order requiring Yale 
University to implement a grievance procedure to deal with 
claims of sexual harassment.38 The students alleged that Yale's 
lack of a grievance policy interfered with the educational process 
and denied them educational opportunities under Title IX.39 One 
female student alleged quid pro quo harassment by a professor 
who offered her a high grade in exchange for sexual favors. 
When she refused, she received a low grade.40 Other plaintiffs 
brought hostile environment claims. 
The Alexander court held that the hostile environment 
claims neither denied the participation in nor the benefits of a 
federally funded program or activity.41 The court, however, did 
recognize quid pro quo harassment, stating that "it is perfectly 
reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned 
upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimina-
tion in education."42 Despite recognizing quid pro quo sexual 
harassment, the court dismissed the suit because the plaintiff 
failed to prove that the harassment actually occurred.43 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit, while affirming the dismissal, also 
recognized a Title IX claim for quid pro quo harassment.44 
B. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS 
Not until Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine did a 
federal court recognize a hostile environment claim as harass-
ment.45 In Moire, a medical student alleged that her supervisor 
had created an environment of sexual harassment and discrimi-
36. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). 
37. See id. at 3-4, 7. 
38. See id. at 2. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. at 3-4. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. at 4. 
43. ld. 
44. See Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185. 
45. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), a{{'d, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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nation, which resulted in her failing her third year of school. 46 
The court found that the guidelines adopted under Title VII for 
the employment setting were applicable to similar situations 
between a student and a teacher under Title IX.47 However, the 
court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the alleged 
behavior had created a hostile environment.48 
After recognizing a hostile environment claim, courts began 
defining the standard to be used in employment cases. Although 
the First Circuit in Lipsett u. University of Puerto Rico49 held 
that Title IX prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment 
in an educational setting, the holding was limited by the facts to 
employment-related claims under Title IX.50 The plaintiff in 
Lipsett was a female medical resident who was both an em-
ployee and a student at the university.51 She alleged that while 
she was a resident at the university hospital her supervisors 
and co-residents sexually harassed her and that she was ulti-
mately expelled from school because of her sex.52 Borrowing 
standards from the Meritor53 case, the First Circuit held that an 
educational institution would be liable for hostile environment 
sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor upon an em-
ployee if an official of the institution knew or should have 
known of the harassment, unless it can be shown that appropri-
ate steps were taken to stop it.54 
The next step in the evolution of hostile environment harass-
ment law was taken by the Supreme Court in Franklin u. 
Gwinett County Public Schools.55 In this case a high school stu-
dent alleged that a teacher had "engaged her in sexually ori-
ented conversations ... , forcibly kissed her ... [and] subjected 
her to coercive intercourse."56 Although school officials were 
aware of and had investigated the allegations, they failed to 
take any action to remedy the situation.57 The lower courts de-
46. See id. at 1365-66. 
47. See id. at 1366-70. 
48. See id. 
49. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
50. See id. at 897. 
51. I d. 
52. See id. at 884. 
53. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
54. See id. at 901. 
55. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
56. Id. at 63. 
57. See id. at 63-64. 
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nied the plaintiff monetary damages. 58 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that monetary damages were available for inten-
tional violations of Title IX where a hostile sexual environment 
was created by a teacher and allowed to continue.59 
Doe v. Petaluma City School District60 represents the last 
step in the federal court system's expansion of Title IX. For the 
first time the Court recognized a claim for student-to-student 
sexual harassment,61 but held that in order to obtain monetary 
damages, the plaintiff had to demonstrate that an employee of 
the educational institution intentionally discriminated based on 
sex.62 The plaintiff averred that she had been sexually harassed 
throughout the seventh and eighth grade and that school offi-
cials were aware of the harassment but did not take appropriate 
action to prevent it.63 The Petaluma court looked to the Franklin 
decision and concluded that although Franklin involved teacher-
to-student sexual harassment, the Court had implied that hos-
tile environment was generally applicable to Title IX.64 They 
reasoned that because Title VII recognized employee-to-em-
ployee sexual harassment, a student-to-student sexual harass-
ment claim could also be implied under Title IX.65 When the 
court considered liability, it noted that the Franklin court re-
quired intent and that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, 
which also requires a finding of intent ifliability is to attach.66 
In sum, the court reasoned that the "knew or should have 
known" test did not apply in the Title IX context and that liabil-
ity would only affix if the school intentionally discriminated on 
the basis of sex. 67 
58. See id. 
59. See id. at 75-76. 
60. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995); See 
949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (different result upon reconsideration). 
61. ld. at 1571-73. 
62. See id. at 1571. 
63. See id. at 1563. 
64. See id. at 1575. 
65. See id. at 1574-75. 
66. See id. at 1574-76. 
67. See id. 
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IV. V ARlO US TESTS PROPOSED BY CIRUIT COURT AND 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
A. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: ROWINSKY V. BRYAN INDEPENDENT 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
In Rowinsky, a suit was brought by the mother of two middle 
school students (Jane and Janet Doe) alleging that the school 
district and its officials condoned and caused hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.68 The complaint alleged that Janet 
was sexually harassed at school by one of her peers, and that 
both Jane and Janet were sexually harassed by peers while 
riding the bus to school.69 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief as well as monetary damages and attorney 
fees under Title IX.70 The district court ruled that Rowinsky had 
failed to state a claim under Title IX because she did not provide 
evidence that sexual harassment was treated less severely to-
ward girls than toward boys.71 
The court of appeals phrased the question before them as, 
"whether the recipient of federal education funds can be found 
liable for sex discrimination when the perpetrator is a party 
other than the grant recipient or its agents."72 Rowinsky argued 
that the word under means in and not by in the Title IX phrase 
"[n]o person ... be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tional program or activities ... :m The Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument, reasoning that scope and structure, legislative 
history, and agency interpretations of the statute all weighed in 
favor of not imposing liability for the acts of third parties. 74 The 
court went on to state that "[i]mposing liability for the acts of 
third parties would be incompatible with the purposes of a 
spending condition, because grant recipients have little control 
over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably violate 
the prohibitions of Title IX."75 Furthermore, the court said that 
in the legislative history both supporters and opponents of Title 
68. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009-10. 
69. See id. at 1010. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. ld. 
73. ld. at 1011. 
74. See id. at 1012. 
75. Id. at 1013. 
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IX focused exclusively on acts by the grant recipients.76 Finally, 
the court asserted that a definition of sexual harassment found 
in an Office of Civil Rights Policy Memorandum only addressed 
harassment by "employees or agents of the recipient" and, there-
fore, did not cover acts by peers. 77 
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: SEAMONS V. SNOW 
The Seamons case stands out because it involved a male 
student who was involved in a high school football hazing inci-
dent.78 Brian Seamons alleged that his teammates forcibly 
bound him (including his genitals) with tape to a towel rack and 
then brought a girl that he had dated into the locker room to see 
him.79 Seamons reported the incident to his coach who, rather 
than disciplining the perpetrators, demanded that Seamons 
apologize to his teammates for turning them in. When he re-
fused, he was kicked off the team.80 Despite continued com-
plaints, the school did nothing until the school district finally 
canceled a playoff game. The district's action led to more harass-
ment, because some students considered Seamons responsible 
for ending the team's season. 81 
Seamons did not allege that the original assault was based 
on sex. Instead, he alleged that the school's response to the inci-
dent was "sexually discriminatory and harassing."82 The district 
court dismissed the suit, holding that Seamons had failed to 
state a claim for intentional discrimination.83 
When the case came before the Tenth Circuit, the court ap-
plied the five part test articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 84 Despite using a 
Davis analysis, the court found that Seamons had not alleged 
sufficient facts to establish that the harassment was based on 
his ·ex.85 The court reasoned that team loyalty and toughness, 
qualities school officials had urged Seamons to adopt in response 
76. See id. at 1014. 
77. ld. at 1015. 
78. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (lO'h Cir. 1996). 
79. See id. at 1230. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. ld. 
83. See id. at 1231. 
84. Id. at 1232 (citing Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194) (before the rehearing en bane). 
85. ld. 
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to the harassment, are not uniquely male; girls at the high 
school had experienced the same types of hazings, which had 
also been ignored.86 Notwithstanding the application of Title VII 
principles to this case, the Tenth Circuit expressed doubt as to 
whether a school district could be liable for a student's actions.87 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit resolved this case without decid-
ing whether a cause of action exists under Title IX for this al-
leged harm. 
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION INTERPRETS 
TITLE IX 
In 1996, the Office of Civil Rights for the United States De-
partment of Education issued an interim policy statement and 
request for comment on student-to-student sexual harassment.88 
Under this policy, student-to-student "sexual harassment can be 
the basis for a Title IX violation if the conduct creates a hostile 
environment and the school has notice of the hostile environ-
ment but fails to remedy it."89 The Department of Education has 
also adopted regulations that are similar to Title IX's language, 
prohibiting institutional discrimination.90 On March 13, 1997, 
the Department of Education issued final policy guidelines on 
student sexual harassment.91 According to these guidelines, 
schools are liable for failing to eliminate sexually harassing 
conduct by another student "that is sufficiently severe, persis-
tent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or 
benefit from an education program or activity, or to create a 
hostile or abusive educational environment."92 
86. See id. at 1233. 
87. !d. at 1232 n. 7. 
88. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment; Draft document 
Availability and Request for Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1996). 
89. !d. 
90. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a)(1996). Section 106.31(a) provides in relevant part that, 
"no person shall, on the basis of sex ... be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any academic, extracurricular ... or other education program or 
activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial 
assistance. n 
91. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997). 
92. !d. at 12,038. 
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D. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: DAVIS v. MONROE COUNTY 
BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
In Davis, a mother brought an action on behalf of her fifth-
grade daughter, LaShonda Davis, alleging student-to-student 
sexual harassment under Title IX and section 1983.93 The plain-
tiff's complaint for injunctive relief and compensatory damages 
alleged that the defendants knew that a male fifth-grade stu-
dent94 continuously harassed her and that the school failed to 
take the appropriate steps to protect her. 95 Davis further alleged 
that the defendants' failure to act not only discriminated against 
her, but denied her the benefits of a public education. 96 The dis-
trict court dismissed the Title IX claim, arguing that the fellow 
student's behavior was not part of a school program or activity. 97 
The district court also dismissed the section 1983 claim against 
the defendants. 98 
On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit found that the Davis' due process and 
equal protection claims were without merit and refused to dis-
cuss them.99 However, the panel reversed the district court as to 
the Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment claim. 100 
The Davis court cited the "sweep as broad as its language" test 
from United States v. Price101 and noted that in Franklin the 
Eleventh Circuit had not applied a Title VII analysis and had 
been overturned.102 The court also noted the gradual expansion 
of liability under Title IX, culminating in Doe v. Petaluma 
School District, as well as a letter of findings from the Depart-
ment of Education's Office of Civil Rights103 and concluded that 
it was appropriate to apply Title VII hostile environment princi-
93. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1188. 
94. Prior to the decision in this case, LaShonda's harasser was charged with and 
plead guilty to sexual battery. See id. at 1189. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. (citing Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 
363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994)). 
98. ld. at 1188. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982). 
102. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
103. Letter of Findings by John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, Region 
IV (July 24, 1992), Docket No. 09-92-6002. 
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ples to a Title IX case.104 Finally, the court concluded that Davis 
had alleged sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of sex-
ual harassment and remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings.105 
In August of 1996, a rehearing en bane was granted, and the 
panel's decision was vacated. 106 The court began its analysis by 
noting district court cases that had recognized a student-to-stu-
dent hostile environment cause of action under Title IX. 107 The 
court then noted that the courts of appeal had been far less en-
thusiastic about finding hostile environment liability under 
Title IX. 108 It also observed that Davis was seeking an extension 
of liability under Title IX.109 The Eleventh Circuit recognized 
that the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the peer 
sexual harassment issue, but only allowed a private right of 
action under Title IX if there was intentional discrimination by 
the school's administration or agentsY0 Davis, the plaintiff-ap-
pellant in this case, did not allege that the school board had 
personally participated in the discrimination against her daugh-
ter. She alleged only that the board did not adequately respond 
to the complaints. 111 Therefore, the court looked at the legisla-
tive history of the bill to see if Congress intended to provide for 
this type of action under Title IX.112 
In June and July of 1970, under the direction of representa-
tive Edith Green, the House Committee on Education and the 
House Subcommittee on Education and Labor held hearings on 
gender discrimination in federally funded-educational pro-
grams.113 The committee's work focused on eliminating gender 
discrimination in school admissions and on the employment 
104. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190-93. 
105. See id. at 1195. 
106. Davis, 91 F.3d 1418. 
107. See Davis, 120 F.3d 1390, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1997). 
108. !d. The court cited Rowinsky, SO F.3d at 1016, where the court ruled that 
there was no cause of action under Title IX for peer sexual harassment, and several 
other cases that did not hold educational institutions liable but also did not decide 
whether a cause of action exists under Title IX. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-
33 (lO'h Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 
(2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9u' Cir. 1994). 
109. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1395. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
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decisions of school administrators. 114 None of the testimony be-
fore the committee concerned student-to-student sexual harass-
ment.115 Although legislation addressing the issue was proposed, 
it did not pass. In 1971, the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare also produced a bill that focused on gender dis-
crimination in school admissions and employment opportunities 
for female teachers. 116 Because of irreconcilable differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions of the bill, it was referred 
to a conference committee.117 The conference committee pro-
duced what is now known as Title IX; it passed both houses and 
was signed into law on June 23, 1972.118 The majority in Davis is 
quick to point out that none of the legislative history of Title IX 
discusses student-to-student sexual harassment.119 
The court also points out that Title IX was enacted under the 
Spending Clause of Article I and argues that the legislative 
history of the law "shows that Congress intended Title IX to be a 
typical contractual spending-power provision."120 The court fur-
ther asserts that the similarities between Title IX and Title VI 
indicate that Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending 
Clause.121 Title VI was enacted under the Spending Clause and 
the language of Title IX is practically identical to that of Title 
VI. Finally, the court points out that the Supreme Court has 
determined that Title IX was patterned after Title VI. 122 
The constitutional source of congressional power is impor-
tant in Davis because it limits how the law can be enforced. The 
court analogizes legislation enacted under the Spending Clause 
to a contract between Congress and the recipients of federal 
funds. 123 A recipient of federal funds is free to decline a grant or 
withdraw from the program if it so chooses.124 Furthermore, in 
order to ensure that participation in the programs is voluntary, 
the Supreme Court requires that Congress give potential recipi-
114. See id. at 1396. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 1397. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. !d. at 1398 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. !d. at 1398. 
122. See id. at 1399 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694). 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
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ents unambiguous notice of the conditions they are assuming.125 
By requiring that the conditions attached to the money be un-
ambiguous, the states are allowed to make an informed decision 
regarding whether they want to participate in a particular pro-
gram. 
The court quotes one of its recent cases that makes this point 
in the context of money offered to school districts: "Congress 
must be unambiguous in expressing to school districts the condi-
tions it has attached to the receipt of federal funds."126 Having 
established that the states must be given notice of the strings 
that are attached to federal money provided under the Spending 
Clause, the court then considered whether the Monroe County 
Board of Education (the Board) had received unambiguous no-
tice that they would be liable for failing to stop student-to-stu-
dent sexual harassment. 
On this point, both the appellant (Davis) and the United 
States Department of Justice (as amicus curiae) argued that the 
Board had clear notice of this type of liability under Title IX.127 
They argued that the Franklin Court suggested that notice is 
not a problem in a case where intentional discrimination is al-
leged.128 Appellant further argued that a school district inten-
tionally discriminates on the basis of sex if it fails to prevent one 
student from sexually harassing another. Therefore, Appellant 
argued, the Board had sufficient notice under the Spending 
Clause.129 
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit disagrees. 130 In the 
opinion of the court, the terms of Title IX only give educational 
institutions notice that they must prevent their employees from 
engaging in intentional gender discrimination. 131 The court 
notes that the complaint did not allege any discrimination by an 
employee ofthe district and concludes this part of its analysis by 
finding that the Board did not have notice that they would be 
held liable in this situation.132 
125. See id. (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
126. Id. at 1399 (citing Cantutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398 (5'h 
Cir. 1996), cert denied, -U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2434, 138 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1997)). 
127. See id. 
128. See id. (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75). 
129. See id. at 1399-1400. 
130. See id. at 1400. 
131. See id. at 1401. 
132. See id. 
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Judge Tjoflat argues against liability under Title IX because 
of "whipsaw" liability. "Whipsaw" liability entails a school dis-
trict facing lawsuits from both the alleged harasser and the 
alleged victim.133 In Tjoflat's opinion, the only way for a school to 
avoid liability under the appellant's standard would be to isolate 
the accused student through suspension or expulsion. 134 Because 
a student has a property interest in his or her education, 
granted by the state and protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, he or she cannot be deprived of this interest without due 
process oflaw.135 The educational institution is thus faced with a 
choice of lawsuits. Tjoflat further argues that faced with this 
choice, an administrator would have an economic incentive to 
punish the harasser in order to protect the receipt of federal 
moneys. This incentive would render the administrator 
impermissibly prejudiced. 136 
Tjoflat also posits that in addition to the "whipsaw" liability, 
an expansion of liability under Title IX would result in extensive 
litigation costs. 137 To support this contention, he cites a study 
that indicates that 65% of public school students in grades eight 
to eleven were victims of student-to-student sexual harass-
ment.138 The expansion ofliability combined with the staggering 
statistics of the study, Tjoflat concludes, would materially affect 
a school district's decision whether to accept federal funding. 139 
The dissent, written by Judge Barkett, insists that the major-
ity's holding would allow school officials to knowingly ignore, 
without risk of liability, the most egregious harassment and 
discrimination-even if observed directly by a school official. 140 
The dissent further avers that the plain meaning of the statute 
allows an educational institution to be liable for student-to-stu-
dent sexual harassment; the identity of the perpetrator is irrele-
vant.141 In fact, the Department of Education's Office of Civil 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 1402. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 1403. 
137. See id. at 1404. 
138. See id. at 1405 (citing AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN 
EDUCATION FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 11 (1993)). 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 1412. 
141. See id. 
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Rights has interpreted Title IX to impose liability for hostile 
environment sexual harassment. 142 Furthermore, the mere fact 
that student-to-student sexual harassment was not discussed in 
the Congressional debates does not mean that it was not encom-
passed within Congress' broad intent of preventing students 
from being subject to discrimination.143 Accordingly, even 
teacher-to-student sexual harassment recognized by the Frank-
lin Court would not be supported by the majority's view of the 
legislative history. 144 The dissent counters the majority's notice 
of liability argument by arguing that the plain meaning of the 
statute was sufficient to give the Board notice of potentialliabil-
ity.145 Finally, the dissent urges that the court should follow the 
lead of other federal courts, which have expanded liability under 
Title IX by continuing to adopt principles from Titles VII and VI 
to allow hostile-environment sexual harassment under Title 
IX.146 
V. ANALYSIS: THE MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION SHOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNDER TITLE IX 
A. DAVIS REACHED THE PROPER CONCLUSION 
The majority clearly reached the correct decision in the Da-
vis case. The argument that the majority opinion finds most 
persuasive is that the Board lacked sufficient notice of liability 
for student-to-student sexual harassment. The notice given to 
the Board was ambiguous at best. At the time of LaShonda's 
alleged harassment, there was no federal case law allowing a 
claim for student-to-student sexual harassment. 147 Furthermore, 
the Department of Education's interim guidelines on sexual 
harassment did not issue until after the harassment allegedly 
took place in this case.148 To date, there have been no circuit 
142. See id. at 1412-13 (citing Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of 
Student by School Employees, Other Students or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 
at 12039-41 (1997)). 
143. See id. at 1413. 
144. See id. at 1413-14. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. at 1414-19. 
147. Doe was the first federal court case to recognize this type of harassment in 
1995. The alleged harassment occurred in 1992-93. 
148. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual Harassment; Draft document 
Availability and Request for Comments, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (1996). 
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court cases that have extended Title IX liability to student-to-
student sexual harassment. Moreover, the Supreme Court had 
declined to decide the issue. 149 Although it could be argued that 
the new Department of Education Guidelines give schools notice 
of liability for suits of this kind, the argument is moot without 
case law to support it. However, the new guidelines and recent 
case law severely weaken the lack of notice argument for school 
districts faced with this type oflitigation in the future. 
There are other reasons that the courts should not extend 
liability under Title IX. First, those who advocate holding 
schools liable for the acts of third parties seem to start from a 
faulty presumption: school officials do not care and will not vol-
untarily act to alleviate the problem. Generally, however, people 
who enter the educational field do so because they care about 
the welfare of children. 
B. ALTERNATNE SOLUTIONS 
There seems to be a mindset in the legal community and 
perhaps in the nation as a whole that the only thing that will 
motivate action or prevent behavior we want to eradicate is the 
fear of litigation and liability. It would be far more productive to 
start from the presumption that a vast majority of administra-
tors and teachers want to and will try to solve the problem. 
Schools under the present system lack the tools to handle the 
problem of sexual harassment. Many of the problems that Judge 
Tjoflat raised are real. School administrators face a Hobbesian 
choice when dealing with this type of issue: face liability if one 
takes action against an accused harasser or face liability if one 
does not. If schools are given the tools they need, clear policy 
and procedures, and the power to enforce them without the con-
stant specter of litigation hanging over their heads, schools will 
be much more effective in combating sexual harassment. 
In order to arm school administrations to combat this prob-
lem, Congress or the Department of Education should outline a 
clear set of procedures for dealing with sexual harassment in 
schools. If they follow the procedures, administrators should be 
allowed immunity for actions taken within the scope of their 
authority, unless the action was an abuse of discretion or mali-
149. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S.- 117 S.Ct. 165 
(1996). 
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cious in nature. If society wants schools to combat sexual ha-
rassment, then schools need to be equipped with the power and 
the immunity necessary to take action. This approach, if taken, 
will eliminate the extremes at both ends of the spectrum: by 
ignoring sexual harassment or overreacting by expelling a 
seven-year-old boy for kissing a classmate. 
Another weakness of extending Title IX liability to student-
to-student sexual harassment is that it does not necessarily 
punish the perpetrator of the harassment. Any solution to the 
sexual harassment problem in our school has to include some 
sort of punishment for the person perpetrating the harassment. 
If harassers are not personally affected, there is little hope of 
solving the problem. If there are clear procedures to be followed 
in response to accusations of sexual harassment combined with 
immunity from suit when an administrator takes action against 
harassers, harassers will be more likely to receive the punish-
ment they deserve. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has traced the evolution of Title IX by address-
ing the statutes that have affected its interpretation of the title: 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964/50 and Title IV of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.151 It has also discussed the response of 
the Office of Civil Rights to the problem as well as the line of 
cases leading to the Eleventh Circuit's most recent decision in 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 152 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit's similar holding in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School 
District. 153 Finally, this article argues that both the Eleventh 
and Fifth Circuits have reached the right result under Title IX 
as it presently stands and contends that holding school liable for 
student-to-student sexual harassment is not the most effective 
means of combating the problem in our schools. The answer is to 
give school administrators and faculty the correct tools to solve 
150. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000n (1988). Title VI reads in relevant part: "No person 
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1994). 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988). 
152. 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997). 
153. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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the problem: clear guidelines and procedures that would allow 
the school officials to punish the perpetrators of sexual harass-
ment with the security of greater immunity from liability. 
George M. Rowley 
